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This paper estimates the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-
experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees and 
left firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Accounting for the endogeneity of the treatment status, we find that the slight 
average wage reduction (between –0.4 and –0.1 percent) that follows the increase in EPL hides highly heterogeneous 
effects. Workers who change firm during the reform period suffer a drop in the entry wage, while incumbent workers are 
left unaffected. Results also indicate that the negative wage effect of the EPL reform is stronger on young blue collars 
and on workers at the low-end of the wage distribution. Finally, workers in low-employment regions suffer higher wage 
reductions after the reform. This pattern suggests that the ability of the employers to shift EPL costs onto wages depends 
on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. 
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Since the work of Lazear (1990), it is well-known that, in a perfectly competitive labour market and in the
absence of contractual frictions, a government-mandated pure transfer (e.g., a severance payment) from rms
to risk neutral workers can be neutralised by an appropriately designed wage contract that lowers the entry
wage by an amount equal to the expected present value of the future transfer. A negative eect of Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) on the entry wage is also predicted by models with labour market frictions and
decentralized bargaining in which job security provisions weaken the threat point of the rm in negotiations with
already employed workers. In both contexts, the impact of EPL on the wage prole is tantamount to a newly-
hired worker posting a bond equal to her share of the future severance payment (Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999; Ljungqvist, 2002; Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).
Thus, theory predicts a dierential impact of ring costs across incumbent and newly-hired workers { insiders
and outsiders in Lindbeck and Snower (1988) terminology. The impact of EPL on wages is also likely to be
heterogeneous across workers with dierent characteristics potentially correlated with their bargaining position
and across local labour markets. For instance, workers with a high degree of risk aversion who value job security
may be more willing to accept a wage cut in exchange for an increase in EPL (Pissarides, 2001; Bertola, 2004),
while workers in tight labour markets may be able to avoid paying for the increased protection thanks to a
better outside option (Pissarides, 2000).
Summing up, the impact of EPL on wages is likely to depend on the bargaining position of workers vis- a-vis
employers, which in turn depends on the labour market status of the worker (incumbent/new-hire), on her
individual characteristics and on the aggregate labour market conditions that determine rms' and workers'
outside options.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the eects of EPL on wages, exploiting the variation in EPL
induced by an Italian reform which raised dismissal costs for rms with 15 or fewer employees and left costs
unchanged for larger rms. We provide complementary evidence to Kugler and Pica (2008) who use the same
reform episode to estimate, as most of the empirical literature on EPL, the eect of ring costs on worker and
job 
ows. We focus, instead, on the adjustment through the wage rate, a margin on which the available evidence
is scant and provides ambiguous results, as will be discussed in Section 2.1. The contribution of this paper is
not only to quantify the causal eect of EPL on wages, but also and foremost to highlight the heterogeneity of
the eect and to relate it to the role of the relative bargaining power of workers and rms. This allows us to
draw a general lesson, which goes arguably beyond the Italian experience, on the heterogeneity of the eects of
EPL across workers with dierent bargaining positions and on the extent to which rms are able to translate
higher EPL costs onto lower wages.
The analysis is based on administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS), and exploits
a matched employer{employee panel which contains the entire population of workers and rms located in
the Italian provinces of Vicenza and Treviso in the north-eastern region of Veneto. The data are well-suited
for studying the eect of the 1990 EPL reform because the Italian North-East is characterized by a high
1concentration of small rms and a tight labour market which makes it similar to many manufacturing regions
in Europe. Moreover, as explained below, the richness of this dataset allows us to build suitable instruments
and apply IV techniques.
Our identication strategy exploits a reform of EPL rules which provides variation both across rms and
over time. Until 1990 the Italian labour code provided a sharp discontinuity in the application of EPL, with no
protection for workers employed in small rms below the 15 employee threshold and high protection for those
employed in rms above the threshold. In July 1990, severance payments were increased from zero to between
2.5 and 6 months of pay for rms with 15 or fewer employees, and left unchanged for rms with more than 15
employees.
We identify the eects of EPL comparing wages of workers employed in rms in the neighbourhood of the 15
employees threshold before and after the law change, thus combining a regression discontinuity design (RDD)
with a dierence-in-dierence (DID) approach. Our identication assumption is essentially that the average
wages of individuals employed in rms marginally above the 15 employees threshold (16{25) represents a valid
counterfactual for the wages of workers employed in rms just below the threshold (5{15) both before and after
the reform, i.e., we expect conditional wages in the treated and control groups to diverge after the law change
for no other reason than the reform itself.
In the course of the paper we address the potential endogeneity of the treatment status. On the one side, it
is possible that marginal rms, which kept their size just below the 15 employees threshold to avoid strict EPL
rules, increased their size because of the reform. To control for rms' sorting into (or out of) the treatment
group according to time-invariant characteristics, we estimate models with rm and match (worker-rm) xed
eects. Additionally, we instrument the treatment status with rm size in 1988 and 1987, when the reform
was not in place and was unexpected. On the other side, workers may also sort in rms below or above the
15 employees threshold according to their preferences over the mix of employment protection and wages. To
control for workers' sorting into rms around the threshold according to xed individual characteristics, we
estimate the model using worker xed eects.
Another concern is the \common time eects" assumption implicit in the DID approach, that assumes that
the pre-reform wage trends are parallel in the treatment and control groups. Even though close to the threshold
this assumption sounds reasonable, we also adopt a triple-dierence strategy that exploits the dierent relevance
of the constraints imposed by EPL on rms in dierent sectors. In particular, we look at whether the impact
of EPL is greater in industries in which the need for labour reallocation is higher.
Our analysis leads to the following results. Baseline estimates indicate a small but signicant wage loss in
rms below the 15 employees threshold relative to larger rms after the 1990 reform that ranges, on average,
between 0.4 and 1 percentage point. Additionally, we nd that wages fell more markedly in sectors with greater
pre-reform employment volatility. This rules out the concern that results are driven by small rm wages being
on a declining time path with respect to wages in larger rms.
The negative eect is not uniformly spread across workers. As suggested by theory, we rst check whether
the EPL reform has a dierent impact on insiders and outsiders. To this aim, we identify two groups of workers:
2(i) a group of incumbent workers, which includes all individuals who are already employed in a rm at the time
of the introduction of the reform in 1990 and stay continuously in the same rm over our sample period; and
(ii) a group of movers, i.e. a group of workers who change rm at least once, before or after 1990, for whom we
observe at least one entry wage. The evidence indicates that after the reform movers suer a drop in the wage
rate of about 2 percent in treated rms below the threshold relative to larger rms, while incumbent workers are
left unaected. Additionally, the estimates show that the negative eect on movers is concentrated upon entry
in the new rm, with a reduction of the entry wage of between 3:4 and 6:3 percent. Post-entry wages of movers
are unaected by the introduction of the EPL reform. Thus, on the one hand rms seem to be able to translate
(part of) the cost of EPL onto workers before the match is formed, when they do not incur in any severance
payment if there is no agreement. On the other hand, incumbent workers and movers (in the years after entry
in the new rm) do not seem to be able to renegotiate their wages upwards (McLeod and Malcomson, 1993).
We then look at whether the impact of EPL on wages depends on individual characteristics presumably
correlated with workers bargaining power in the employment relationship, and nd that the negative wage
eect of the EPL reform is stronger among low-bargaining power workers, such as young blue collars workers.1
Furthermore, but unfortunately only for part of the sample, we have a direct measure of bargaining power,
given by the individual wage premium over the sectoral contractual minimum { the wage drift.2 Results from
quantile regressions suggest that workers at the 5th percentile of the distribution of the wage drift suer a wage
reduction ve times as large as workers at the 90th percentile and three times as large as the average eect.
Finally, we exploit the theoretical insight that the bargaining power of workers should also depend on the
local labour market conditions that aect workers' and rms' relative outside options, through the probabilities
of nding a job and lling a vacancy. To test this idea we look at a sample of workers over the whole Italian
territory and proxy the tightness of the local labour markets using the regional employment rates of males
aged 25-64. We nd that workers in low-employment regions suer higher wage reductions in rms below the
threshold relative to larger rms after the reform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical (Section 2.1), empirical
(Section 2.2) and institutional (Section 2.3) background of our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the dataset
and the sample selection rules. Section 4 explains the identication strategy used to evaluate the impact of
EPL on wages. Section 5 presents estimates of the impact of increased strictness of employment protection in
small rms in Italy after 1990 on average wages. Section 6 investigates the heterogeneity of the wage eects
along multiple dimensions: insiders/outsiders, workers with dierent observable characteristics correlated with
their bargaining position, and wage eects at dierent point of the wage drift distribution and in regions with
1Dolado et al. (2007) analyse the heterogeneous eect of stricter dismissal procedures for dierent groups of workers within
a matching framework and show that the wages of low- and high-productivity workers react dierently to dierent types of EPL
reforms.
2Although at the time of the reform wages in Italy were set through a highly centralized bargaining process at the sectoral
level, there was still room left for rms to react to the law change because contractual minimum wages were in most cases hardly
binding and an important component of workers' compensation was determined at the rm and individual level in the form of
company-level wage increments, production bonuses and other variable benets (Guiso et al., 2005). In terms of the magnitude of
the rm-specic part of the wage, between one sixth and one quarter of the compensation was rm-specic. In terms of diusion,
half of Italian workers were involved in rm-level negotiations in the period covered by our sample. These estimates, based on data
in the metal products, machinery and equipment industry are reported by CESOS, an association of trade unions. See Erickson
and Ichino (1995) for further details on wage formation in Italy for the period covered by our data.
3dierent labour market conditions. Finally, Section 7 discusses the results and concludes with a back of the
envelope calculation of the share of EPL costs translated into lower wages.
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical background
Under Nash bargaining, ring costs aect rms' outside option in bilateral wage negotiations with workers
because, in the absence of a wage agreement, rms have to pay severance with an associated drop in prots.3
In their standard matching model with a two-tier wage structure, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) assume
that the rm does not incur in any ring costs if there is no agreement on the wage in the rst encounter
because no employment relationship yet exists. In this framework workers prepay for higher EPL via lower
entry wages and enjoy a subsequent one-shot increase in post-entry wages.4 Ljungqvist (2002) shows that this
formulation is formally equivalent to assuming that the relative split of the surplus of the match is left unaected
by ring costs throughout the employment relationship. The equivalence arises because the wage prole under
the Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) set-up is homomorphic to new workers posting a bond equal to their share
of any future expected ring costs (as in Lazear (1990), discussed in the introduction). Therefore, the model
predicts a negative eect of EPL on workers' cumulative wage bill (net of ring costs) and a distinction between
the eect on entry and post-entry wages.
In order to better understand the mechanism, consider the choice facing the rm and the worker when they
rst meet (Pissarides, 2000). If they sign the contract the pay-o to the rm is J0. Therefore the initial wage
w0 is chosen to maximize the product B0 = (W0   U)(J0   V )1  where V and J0 are the rm's net worth
from a vacancy and from a job paying w0, and W0 and U are the worker's net worth from a job paying w0 and
unemployment. After the worker is taken on, if the rm fails to agree on a continuation wage its loss will be
J++F where F is the ring cost. Therefore, the post-entry wage maximizes B+ = (W+ U)(J++F  V )1 .
Of course, a crucial point is whether workers are able to force a wage renegotiation after entry. MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993) argue that they cannot because they have no credible threat if the rm refuses to renegotiate.
However, if renegotiation takes place, the model predicts tighter employment protection to increase wages in
post-entry negotiations to re
ect the fact that, once the job has started, the rm is locked into the relationship
by the ring tax. Anticipating this, employers reduce wages at entry when the worker is still unprotected.5
While the model described above oers predictions on the eect of the introduction of EPL on the wage level,
it is not equally helpful in understanding the eects of EPL on workers' wage-tenure prole. In that model, an
3Recent theory has highlighted the crucial role of wage determination mechanisms for the analysis of the employment eects of
ring costs in matching models. On this, see especially Ljungqvist (2002) but also Garibaldi and Violante (2005) and Cahuc and
Koeniger (2007) in the Economic Journal special issue on EPL.
4In this formulation an increase in EPL leads to an increase of equilibrium employment. Alternatively, ring costs may be
assumed to weaken the rm's threat point from the rst negotiation with a newly hired worker, thereby increasing the worker's
relative share of the surplus of the match. In this case, rms are not able to undo the detrimental eect of ring costs on prots
by reducing worker's wages. Workers become insiders { and extract the associated rents { since the rst encounter with the rm
and suer no wage losses. Ljungqvist (2002) shows that, under this hypothesis, EPL reduces the equilibrium employment level.
5Lindbeck and Snower (1988) reject the plausibility that rms can make outsiders fully prepay the EPL cost via a lower wage
for a number of reasons that limit the downward 
exibility of wages, such as the presence of minimum wages. This implies that
rms will fail to translate the entire costs of EPL on workers. We will return on this issue in Section 7.
4increase in EPL implies a stepwise increase in the wage of incumbent workers (and also of movers' post-entry
wages) if workers can force a wage renegotiation, but does not change the slope of the wage-tenure prole.
Indeed, virtually all theoretical studies in the literature (with some exceptions, see for example Cozzi, Fella and
Violante, 2011) assume that productivity { and therefore wages { does not vary with tenure. This assumption
makes these models unsuitable to study how EPL aects the evolution of workers' wages with respect to their
tenure in the rm.
However, results from the empirical literature suggest at least two contrasting channels through which EPL
may aect workers' tenure prole. On the one side, stricter EPL may raise the incentives to invest in rm-
specic human capital (Autor et al., 2003; Wasmer, 2006; Belot et al., 2007; Cingano et al., 2010) thus raising
productivity growth and the slope of the wage-tenure prole. On the other side, higher EPL may reduce the
incentives to exert eort and may therefore imply a lower growth rate of productivity and a 
atter wage-tenure
prole (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005). Eventually, the eect of EPL on the relationship between wages and tenure
is an empirical question that we will address in Section 5.
2.2 Related empirical literature
While there is a large empirical literature on the eects of EPL on job 
ows, relatively little empirical evidence
is available on the wage eects of dismissal costs.6 Using aggregate data Bertola (1990) shows that in high job
security countries wages tend to be lower. More recently, using rm-level data, Martins (2009) shows that lower
EPL raises wages in Portugal while Bird and Knopf (2009) nd evidence of a relationship between the adoption
of wrongful-discharge protections and the increase in labour expenses of U.S. commercial banks. Autor et al.
(2007) and Cingano et al. (2010) look at the eect of EPL on rm-level productivity.
More related to this paper are the studies conducted on individual data. These papers reach disparate
conclusions: Autor et al. (2006) nd no evidence that wrongful-discharge laws had a signicant negative impact
on wage levels in the U.S.; Cervini Pl a et al. (2010) analyse the 1997 reform of Spanish severance pay and
payroll taxes and conclude that a reduction in ring costs and payroll taxes had a positive eect on wages; Van
der Wiel (2010) nds opposite results for the Netherlands using a reform that aected dierently high- and
low-tenured workers.
Our paper is distinct from these studies in many respects. First, it is the only study that looks explicitly
at the heterogeneity of the wage eects of EPL in relation to workers' bargaining power. Second, identication
is cleanly achieved by means of a Regression Discontinuity Design combined with a Dierence-in-Dierence
approach. Third, dierently from Martins (2009) and Bird and Knopf (2009) we look at individual wages rather
than average rm-level wages. Finally, we look at all workers and not only at displaced workers as Cervini Pl a
et al. (2010) and address explicitly the issue of endogeneity of the treatment status with instrumental variables.
6Previous empirical literature mostly concentrates on the eects of EPL on employment 
ows. Among the many papers in the
literature, only few exploit the discontinuities in ring costs regimes that apply to rms of dierent sizes within countries. Boeri
and Jimeno (2005) assess the eect of EPL on lay-o probabilities by comparing rms below and above 15 employees in Italy, while
Kugler and Pica (2006) examine the joint impact of EPL and product market regulation on job 
ows in Italy using both the rm
size threshold and a law change. Using a dierence-in-dierences approach, Bauer et al. (2007) investigate the impact of granting
employees the right to claim unfair dismissal on employment in small German rms.
52.3 Institutional background
As a form of worker protection for open-ended contracts, labour codes specify the causes for fair dismissal, and
establish workers' compensation depending on the reason for termination.7
Over the years the Italian legislation ruling unfair dismissals has changed several times. Both the magnitude
of the ring cost and the coverage of the rms subject to the restrictions have gone through extensive changes.
Individual dismissals were rst regulated in Italy in 1966 through Law 604, which established that employers
could freely dismiss workers either for economic reasons (considered as fair \objective" motives) or in case of
misconduct (considered either as fair \subjective" motive or as just cause). However, in any case workers could
take employers to court and judges would determine if the dismissals were indeed fair or unfair. In case of unfair
dismissal, employers had the choice to either reinstate the worker or pay severance, which depended loosely on
tenure and rm size. Firms with fewer than 60 employees had to pay half the severance paid by rms with
more than 60 employees, and rms with fewer than 35 workers were completely exempt.8
In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law 300) established that all rms with more than 15 employees had to
reinstate workers and pay their foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals. Firms with fewer than 15 employees
remained exempt.
Finally, Law 108 was introduced in July 1990 restricting dismissals for permanent contracts in small rms.
This law introduced severance payments of between 2.5 and 6 months pay for unfair dismissals in rms with
15 or fewer employees.9 Firms with more than 15 employees still had to reinstate workers and pay foregone
wages in case of unfair dismissals. This means that the cost of unfair dismissals for rms with fewer than 15
employees increased relative to the cost for rms with more than 15 employees after 1990.
For our purposes, this reform has two attractive features. First, it was largely unexpected: the rst published
news of the intention to change the EPL rules for small rms appeared in the main Italian nancial newspaper
{ Il Sole 24 Ore { at the end of January 1990. Second, it imposed substantial costs on small rms: Kugler and
Pica (2008) look at the eect of this reform on job and workers 
ows and nd that accessions and separations
decreased by about 13% and 15% in small relative to large rms after the reform. At the end of the paper we
will comment on the relative importance of the adjustment through employment and wages.
The 15 employees threshold is not only relevant for EPL provisions but also for the establishment of the so
called \Rappresentanze Sindacali Aziendali" (RSA). Workers of rms with more than 15 employees can elect
trade union representatives at rm level (RSA), who can call general meetings and referendum and ax posters
on union activities. They also have the right to vote for a worker representative for safety related issues. The
practical relevance of this rule, however, is likely to be minor, as collective agreements which set minimum wage
by worker qualication also apply to workers and rms that do not belong to unions. In any case, what is
7Labour codes also limit trial periods|that is, the period of time during which a rm can test and dismiss a worker at no cost
(in Italy 3 months) and mandate a minimum advance notice period prior to termination (1 month). Dierently from open-ended
contracts, temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost provided that the duration of the contract has expired.
8Severance pay for unfair dismissals ranged between 5 and 8 months for workers with less than two and a half years of tenure,
between 5 and 12 months for those between two and a half and 20 years of tenure, and between 5 and 14 months for workers with
more than 20 years of tenure in rms with more than 60 employees.
9The law prescribes that the 15 employees threshold should refer to establishments rather than rms. Although in our data we
only have information at the rm level, this is unlikely to be a concern because in the empirical analysis we focus on rms between
5 and 25 employees that are plausibly single-plant rms.
6relevant for our identication strategy is that there are no reforms on this matter over our sample period.
In addition, in 1992 two other legislative changes were introduced. The rst was a pension reform which
changed retirement ages and reference periods for calculating pensions. The second initiative eliminated a wage
indexation mechanism (Scala Mobile) that had been in place since 1945 for rms of all sizes. Since these reforms
do not apply dierentially to rms of dierent sizes, our identication strategy fully controls for dierences in
outcomes due to the pension and wage indexation reforms.
The only reform that may potentially confound our results is the collective dismissals reform that took place
in 1991. A special procedure was introduced for rms with more than 15 employees willing to dismiss ve or
more workers (within 120 days) because of plant closure or restructuring. The collective dismissals' procedures
require a credible risk of bankruptcy and rms are required to engage in negotiations with unions and the
government to reach an agreement on the dismissals. However, if public administration ocials determine that
an agreement cannot be reached, the rm is free to downsize and the employees are not allowed to take the
rm to court i.e. collective dismissals do not impose additional ring costs on rms. In Section 5 we will test
whether our results are confounded by the eects of this other reform.
3 Data description
This paper uses the VWH dataset which is an employer{employee panel with information on the characteristics
of both workers and rms.10
The longitudinal panel is constructed from the administrative records of the Italian Social Security System
(INPS). It refers to the entire population of employers and workers of the private sector in two provinces,
Treviso and Vicenza, of the Italian region of Veneto located in the north-eastern part of the country. The
overall population in the two provinces was 1.6 million people (2.7% of the total Italian population) as of
the 2001 Population Census. Starting from a relatively backward economic condition after World War II,
Veneto enjoyed fast growth in the post-war period rst reaching the national average GDP per capita and then
outgrowing it: in 2000 GDP per capita in Veneto was 20% higher than the national average.
There are two reasons to use these data. The rst is that, although limited to two provinces, the data are
well-suited for studying the eect of the 1990 EPL reform because the Italian North-East is characterized by
a high concentration of small rms and a tight labour market which makes it similar to many manufacturing
regions of France or Germany. Therefore the results may be relevant for other labour markets outside Veneto.11
The second reason is that we need the information on the universe of workers and rms to be able to build
suitable instruments for rm size and apply IV techniques. A random sample of the whole Italian working
population is available from the same administrative source, but it is a representative sample of workers and
10Cingano and Rosolia (2012) investigate network eects on job nding probabilities using the same data.
11The average establishment size in Veneto is 13 employees. Half of the employment stock is not subject to protection against
dismissal as stated by art. 18 of the Statuto dei Lavoratori. Over the last decades, Veneto has been a full employment region with
a positive rate of job creation in manufacturing, compared to a negative national rate and positive migration 
ows. Typical manu-
facturing activities are garments, mechanical goods, goldsmiths, leather, textile, furniture and plastics. The stock of manufacturing
workers in the two Veneto provinces of Treviso and Vicenza has varied between 194,000 employees in the early 1980s and 233,000
employees in 1996, with a yearly positive average rate of variation of 1.4%. The average rate of growth in employment is the result
of a marked increase in white collar and women (Tattara and Valentini, 2005).
7not of rms. Therefore, it neither allows us to follow rms over time nor to build appropriate instruments for
rm size to estimate IV models. For this reason, we only use the nationwide random sample in Section 6.4 to
look at the dierential eect of the reform across local labour markets.
The VWH dataset includes universal information on all rms and employees working at least one day in
any rm of the two provinces from 1985 to 1997. In particular, it includes information on employees' age,
gender, occupation (blue collar/white collar), yearly wage, number of paid weeks, type of contract (perma-
nent/temporary), and information on rms' location, sector and rm size measured as the average (weighted
by number of worked months), number of employees.12 Unfortunately, we have no information on education.
The unit of observation is the employer-day; such information is used to build a complete history of the working
life of each employee. Once they are in the dataset, employees are followed, independently of their place of
residence, even in their occupational spells (in the private sector) out of Treviso and Vicenza.
The original archives only include information on private sector rms in the manufacturing and service
sectors, therefore all workers in the public sector, agriculture and self-employment are excluded. This selection is
common for administrative data which typically include the private sector only. Since the individual longitudinal
records are generated using social security numbers and collect information on private sector employees for
the purpose of computing retirement benets, employees are only followed through their employment spells.
The only reason of dropping out of the dataset is exit from the private sector or from employment status
altogether. The data stop following individuals who move into self-employment, public sector, agricultural
sector, underground economy, unemployment, or retirement.13
3.1 Sample selection
We select (i) all males between 20 and 55 years of age, (ii) hired on an open-ended contract, (iii) with a valid
wage between 1989-1993. We exclude females because the trade-o between job security and wages is likely
to be aected by fertility decisions on which we have no information. For instance, Prifti and Vuri (2011)
nd that the strengthening of the EPL regime imposed by the 1990 reform positively aected the propensity
to childbearing for Italian working women and may have changed their incentives to participate to the labour
market. They nd that young female workers in small rms below the 15 employee threshold after the reform
had higher incentives to both give birth and return back to work afterwards. Depending on whether this
compositional eect is stronger for low- or high-wage women this may generate an upward or downward bias
on our estimates.14
12The labour code computes the 15 employees threshold in terms of full-time equivalents rather than in terms of heads in order
to avoid rms bypassing EPL regulations by hiring workers under xed-term contracts. In particular, the labour code excludes
from the threshold's calculation apprentices and temporary workers below nine months, and includes part-time workers and all
other temporary contracts in proportion to their actual time worked during the week. For this reason rm size is computed as the
average number of employees weighted by number of worked months in the rm during the year.
13Using Bank of Italy survey data (SHIW), we nd that at the beginning of our sample period in 1989 the private sector
constitutes 52 percent of total employment of males aged 20 to 55; agriculture represents only 2 percent while public employment
and self employment represent 23 percent each. The vast majority of private sector workers do not move out of private sector
employment: after two years 83% of males aged between 20 and 55 employed in the private sector in 1989 are still private sector
workers; 6.7% move to the public sector, only 2.3% to self employment and to agriculture and 5.7% become unemployed or retire
early. These gures are stable over time and transition rates for dierent years are very similar.
14Additional selection issues make the analysis on Italian women dicult. The female employment rate in Italy over our sample
period (1989-1993) was a very low 35%, about half of the male employment rate and well below northern European gures. Olivetti
8We also exclude workers on temporary contracts because employment protection provisions are guaranteed
only to workers on open-ended contracts. In order to stay as close as possible to the reform year 1990, we
focus on the period 1989{1993 excluding years 1988 and 1987 to be able to use rm size in those pre-reform
out-of-sample years as instruments for current rm size. We also remove year 1990 because the reform occurred
in the month of July and the annual wages of year 1990 are likely to be a mixture of pre-reform and post-reform
wages. However, we will test the robustness of our results both to dierent time periods (Table B.8) and to the
inclusion of 1990 (Table 2). To preserve comparability between treatment and control groups, we further select
the sample to rms within the interval 5{25 employees.
In the course of the paper we use weekly wages (annual wages divided by the number of weeks worked)
after eliminating the upper and lower 1% of the wage distribution in each year. In case the same individual
has multiple employment spells in dierent rms in the same year we keep the longest spell. The nal sample
includes 9,914 rms and 29,177 workers for a total of 96,333 observations. We observe an entry wage for about
one third of the sample, namely for the 9,667 workers (28,451 observations) who changed rm at least once over
our sample period. The remaining 19,510 workers (67,882 observations) stayed with the same rm throughout
the sample period.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 1. The number of small
rms (5{15) is higher than the number of large rms (16{25), so is the number of workers employed in small
rms, both before and after the reform. The real weekly wage of workers in large rms is around 307 (331)
Euro at 1995 prices per week before (after) the reform vs. a signicantly lower wage of 293 (313) Euro per week
in small rms before (after) the reform. The average age of workers is not signicantly dierent across the two
groups while larger rms employ a slightly higher proportion of white collar workers and, as expected, have a
slightly lower turnover (i.e. they employ a lower proportion of movers). Tenure is on average equal to 3.5 years
before the reform and 5.5 years after the reform in both small and large rms.
4 Identication strategy
The estimand of interest is the average treatment eect of EPL on wages. We exploit both the discontinuity
in EPL at the 15 employees threshold and the reform of EPL which aected only small rms to build an RDD
combined with a DID strategy to estimate the causal eect of EPL on wages.
In order to identify the impact of dismissal costs on wages, we compare the change in mean wages paid by
rms just below 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform to the change in mean wages paid by rms just
above 15 employees. In other words, the assumption that guarantees that the eect of EPL on wages can be
interpreted as causal is that any variable that aects wages is either continuous at the threshold (as in standard
RDD) or its discontinuity is constant over time (as in standard DID). Another identication assumption is
and Petrongolo (2008) document that in countries in which female employment rates are low, female selection into employment
is non-random as only high-productivity females self-select into employment. A further and more serious selection problem may
be induced by the reform itself. Before Prifti and Vuri (2011), Adser a (2004) documents that unstable employment relationships
depress fertility and Bratti et al. (2005) nd that Italian women who enjoy a greater amount of employment protection have a
higher incentive to return to work in the three years following childbirth compared to female workers in less protected jobs.
9Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Pre-reform Post-reform
Small rms Large rms Small rms Large rms
Real weekly wages 293.738 307.454 312.923 331.243
(72.011) (82.479) (78.545) (90.367)
Firm size 9.604 19.496 9.541 19.551
(2.953) (2.824) (2.958) (2.830)
White collar dummy 0.134 0.161 0.133 0.165
(0.340) (0.368) (0.340) (0.371)
Movers (proportion) 0.309 0.258 0.313 0.268
(0.462) (0.438) (0.464) (0.443)
Age 34.565 34.990 37.489 37.918
(8.556) (8.498) (8.675) (8.623)
Tenure 3.50 3.61 5.51 5.68
(1.62) (1.59) (2.52) (2.47)
Sectoral dummies:
Agriculture 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.080) (0.065) (0.077) (0.071)
Gas-water-oil 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.030) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000)
Extraction-minerals-chemical 0.079 0.091 0.077 0.103
(0.270) (0.288) (0.267) (0.305)
Metal 0.274 0.330 0.271 0.311
(0.446) (0.470) (0.445) (0.463)
Manufacturing 0.244 0.297 0.237 0.292
(0.430) (0.457) (0.425) (0.455)
Construction 0.154 0.110 0.163 0.109
(0.361) (0.313) (0.369) (0.312)
Wholesale-retail-hotel 0.182 0.108 0.184 0.118
(0.386) (0.311) (0.388) (0.323)
Transportation 0.031 0.025 0.034 0.026
(0.173) (0.156) (0.180) (0.158)
Banks-insurance 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.014
(0.107) (0.110) (0.099) (0.118)
N 15965 8342 45848 26178
Notes: Sample of years 1989-1993, all males aged 20-55 with an open-ended contract in rms of between 5 and 25 employees. Real
wages are expressed in 1995 Euro. Movers are dened as workers who change rm at least once over the period 1989-1993. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
10that the average wage of individuals employed in rms marginally below the 15 employees threshold (5{15) is
expected to diverge from the wage of the control group employed in rms just above the threshold (16{25) for
no other reason than the law change, i.e. the trend of wages paid in rms above 15 employees represents a good
counterfactual for the trend of wages paid in rms with 15 or fewer employees, a reasonable assumption in a
neighbourhood of the threshold.
If workers and rms were exogenously assigned to the treatment and control groups, OLS estimates of the














jt) + eijt (1)
DS
jt = 1[rm size  15 in year t]
Post = 1[year  1991]
The dependent variable is the log of the weekly wage paid to worker i by rm j in year t and is given by the
yearly wage divided by the number of paid weeks. The variable Post is a dummy that takes the value of 1
starting from 1991 and zero otherwise; DS
jt is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed in
year t in a rm with 15 or fewer employees and 0 if the worker is employed in a rm with strictly more than
15 employees (in the following we will refer to this dummy as the small-rm dummy). The interaction term
DS
jt  Post between the small-rm dummy and the post-reform dummy is included to capture the eect of the
EPL reform. All specications contain a polynomial of third degree in rm size.15
The matrix Xijt includes age dummies, an occupation (white collar/blue collar) dummy, nine industry
dummies and year dummies which account for macro shocks (and prevent identication of the post-reform
dummy). The reported standard errors account for possible error correlations at the individual level in all
specications.
As remarked above, our dierences-in-dierences strategy relies on the \common time eects" assumption,
according to which treated and untreated workers are on the same time path. However, small rms might well
be on a declining time path with respect to larger rms above the threshold. Additionally, the dierences-in-
dierences approach allows us to control for macro shocks coinciding with the reform but assumes that these
shocks have similar eects on rms on the two sides of the threshold. It is possible, however, that the business
cycle aects small and large rms dierently. For example, if small rms are aected more by downturns, then
we should have observed lower wages in small relative to large rms during the post-reform period due to the
strong recession of 1992 and 1993. Violation of these assumptions { though unlikely in a small neighbourhood
of the 15 employees threshold { would bias our results. To account for these potential sources of bias, we allow
for the possibility that the introduction of dismissal costs may have stronger eects in more volatile sectors,
15Results are robust to this functional form assumption. Alternatively, a split polynomial approximation (as in Lee, 2008) or a
local linear regression can be used in RDD regressions. See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for an overview of dierent alternatives.
See Section 5.1 for robustness exercises.







































jt) + eijt: (2)
The variable V k
S denotes the variance of employment growth in sector k during the pre-reform period calculated
separately for rms above and below the 15 employees threshold. The coecient 
6 captures the dierential
eect of the reform in rms below the threshold relative to larger rms with more than 15 employees in sectors
with dierent pre-reform employment volatility.
Equations (1) and (2) give unbiased estimates only if workers and rms are exogenously assigned to the
treatment status. However, the conditional comparison of wages in rms on the two sides of the threshold does
not provide an unbiased estimate of the average treatment eect if rms and workers with dierent unobservable
characteristics endogenously choose their treatment or control status: individuals may decide to work in rms
below or above the threshold, and rms in turn may decide to grow above or shrink below 15 employees. Thus,
a fundamental concern of this paper is the non-random selection of workers and rms above and below the 15
employees threshold to which we now turn.
4.1 The distribution of rm size and rm sorting
Identication in Equations (1) and (2) is threatened by the possibility that rms sort around the 15 employees
threshold. Regressions using rm xed eects control for all time-invariant unobserved factors that may aect
the propensity of rms to self-select into (or out of) treatment. However, rm xed eects do not account for
the selection due to the reform itself. Firms in a neighbourhood of the 15 employees threshold may change
their size in response to the 1990 reform of EPL, thus biasing the estimates. For example, rms which kept
their size just below 15 employees before the reform to avoid strict EPL rules, may have increased their size
because the reform made the gap in EPL provisions narrower. The sign of the bias due to rms' sorting is not
easy to establish and depends on which type of rms moved because of the reform. If rms which moved from
below to above the threshold were those with bad growth perspectives and lower productivity (thus reducing
the distance between wages paid in the treatment and in the control group of rms), then presumably OLS
estimates understate the negative eect of the reform on wages. On the other hand, OLS would overestimate
the negative eects if rms which moved were high-productivity rms.
In this section, we assess the validity of our identication strategy with two dierent procedures. First, we
formally check for the absence of manipulation of the running variable (violated if rms were able to alter their
size and sort above or below the threshold) testing the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of rm size at
15 employees as proposed by McCrary (2008). Second, we check whether the probability of rm growth around
the 15 employees threshold changes after the reform.
In the left panels of Figure 1, we plot the frequency of rms between 5 and 25 employees in year 1989 (before
12the reform) and in year 1991 (after the reform). Visual inspection does not reveal any clear discontinuity at the
15 employees threshold, only a small dip in the distribution at 16. In the right panels of Figure 1, we formally
test for the presence of a density discontinuity at the threshold by running kernel local linear regressions of the
log of the density separately on both sides of the threshold (McCrary, 2008). There, no evidence of manipulative
sorting can be detected: as we can see from the gure, the log-dierence between the frequency to the right
and to the left of the threshold is not statistically signicant, neither in 1989 nor in 1991. The point estimate
is -0.071(0.090) in 1989 and 0.141(0.087) in 1991.16
The reader may be puzzled by the apparent inconsistency between a large dierence in EPL at the 15 em-
ployees threshold and the continuity of the rm size distribution. The average rm size in Italy is approximately
half that of the European Union and expensive EPL for rms with more than 15 employees is often indicated as
one of the factors responsible for such a skewed size distribution. This claim does not seem to be conrmed in
the data: Schivardi and Torrini (2008) and Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2004) nd that rms just below
15 employees are only about 2% less likely to grow than larger rms (this result is conrmed in our data, see
below). Schivardi and Torrini (2008) explain this nding arguing, rst, that rms on a growing (or shrinking)
pattern may nd themselves temporarily slightly above 15 employees and, second, that rms may adjust other
margins to cope with stricter EPL.
One possibility, investigated in this paper, is that protected workers pay for the additional EPL with lower
wages. Another possible adjustment margin is through hours, which we partially address looking at weekly
wages. Yet another margin { outside the scope and the data availability of this paper { is investment (Cingano
et al. 2010): stricter EPL may induce rms to substitute rigid labour with capital and raise the capital-labour
ratio. It is noteworthy that the fact that EPL seems to have small or no threshold eects on the rm size
distribution holds also for Germany, where a 10 employees threshold applies (Bauer et al., 2007 and Wagner et
al., 2001).
The density tests shown in Figure 1 may, however, have low power if manipulation has occurred on both
sides of the threshold. In that case, there might be non-random sorting not detectable in the distribution of
the running variable. For this reason in Appendix A.1 we perform a further test to verify whether rms sort
around the threshold at the time of the reform: we compare the probability of rm growth before and after the
reform conditioning on initial rm size and pre-reform average wages. Consistently with Schivardi and Torrini
(2008) and Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2004), results in Table A.1 of Appendix A.1 show that rms just
below 15 employees are about 3% less likely to grow than larger rms, but the eect is not signicantly dierent
before and after the reform and for rms with dierent average pre-reform wages.
While the fact that there is little evidence of sorting according to observables is reassuring, to control for the
sorting of rms into the treatment or control group according to unobservable time-invariant characteristics, we
estimate rm- and match-eect models that control for any permanent dierences between rms and worker-rm
pairs.
16This and the following gures are obtained using the benchmark sample and averaging individual wages by rm size. Note that
the variable rm size is not an integer number but varies at each decimal because it measures the average number of employees
weighted by number of worked months in the rm during the year
13Figure 1. Frequency of rm size in 1989 and 1991 (left panels). McCrary test of density continuity (right panels): weighted
kernel estimation of the log density, performed separately on either side of the threshold. Optimal binwidth and binsize as in
McCrary (2008).
4.2 The IV model
Firm- and match-eect models do not allow to control for the sorting induced by time-varying factors, including
the reform itself. To this aim, we adopt an IV strategy and instrument the treatment status (the rm size
dummy), with rm size in the pre-reform period. To reduce the concern that the instrument is aected by the
reform, we disregard the immediate pre-reform year 1989 and use as instruments rm size in years 1987 and
1988, prior to the years considered in the benchmark sample 1989-1993.17 The formal specication of the IV
model is:































jpre is a vector that includes rm size in 1988 and in 1987. The term DS
jt  Post is also instrumented
using as an instrument SS
jpre  Post. The matrix Xijt contains the same controls as in Equation (1). Notice
that, in order to build the instruments, it is necessary to follow rms over time. For this reason it is crucial to
have information on the universe of workers and rms, as the VWH dataset described in Section 3 does.
Figure 2 captures the key element of the relationship between the running variable (the dummy DS
jt in
Equation (1) which indicates current rm size equal or smaller than 15 employees) and rm size in 1988, and
can be thought of as a plot of the rst stage of Equation (3).18 The Figure shows that rms with 15 or fewer
17Results are similar using 1989 and 1988 (see Leonardi and Pica, 2010).
18For clarity reasons the gure uses only the pre-reform year 1988 while the actual rst stage in Equation(1) uses both 1988 and
14Figure 2. The dots represent the probability of being a rm below the 15 employees threshold in the period 1989-1993 averaged
in intervals of 0.1 rm size in 1988. The solid line is a tted regression of the small-rm dummy on a 3rd degree polynomial in the
pre-reform rm size, performed separately on either side of the threshold.
employees in 1988 are more likely to have fewer than 15 employees in the following years of the sample 1989-1993
(the average probability of being below the threshold in 1989-1993 across rms between 5 and 15 employees in
1988 is 0.65), while rms above 15 employees in 1988 are more likely to stay larger than 15 in the following years
(the average probability of being below the threshold in 1989-1993 across rms between 16 and 25 employees
in 1988 is less than 0.1).
While there are transitions across the threshold in both directions, Table A.1 of Appendix A.1 shows that
these transitions are not abnormal in years around 1990. As expected, the gure also shows that small rms
below the 15 employees threshold in 1988 are more likely to grow in the following years (1 minus the probability
of being small in 1989-1993) than are large rms in 1988 to shrink. Overall, Figure 2 shows that past rm size
does predict current rm size and is in this sense a good instrument. Additionally, as discussed in Section 2.3,
the reform was largely unanticipated and was hastily introduced so it is highly unlikely that rms in 1988 and
1987 were determining their size in view of the new regulations, thus allowing us to control for the sorting due
to the reform itself. Of course, the validity of the IV estimates rest on the (untestable) assumption that the
instruments satisfy the exclusion restrictions, i.e. that they do not directly aect wages.
4.3 Worker sorting
Identication of Equation (1) may be also threatened by workers non-randomly sorting in rms around the
15 employees threshold and choosing their own EPL regime by selecting the size of the rm they work for.
Sorting may bias our results as long the selection process is driven by worker characteristics that we are not
1987. The corresponding rst stage equations { one for the main eect DS
jt and one for the interaction DS
jt  Post { are presented
in Table B.5 and discussed in Section 5.
15able to control for. Suppose, for example, that low-productivity workers disproportionately apply to (and
are subsequently hired in) more protected jobs. In this case, a negative association between wages and job
protection could not be interpreted as the causal eect of EPL on wages, because it would rather re
ect the
dierent composition of the pool of workers in protected and non protected jobs. We run two dierent tests
of workers' sorting and we show the results in Appendix A.2 for convenience. We rst check whether rms
observable characteristics, such as industry, age, and occupation (white collar/blue collar) composition of the
workforce are balanced in the neighbourhood of the 15 employees threshold in the post- relative to the pre-reform
period. If non-random workers sorting due to the reform were to occur, we would expect these characteristics to
dier systematically between treated and untreated rms in the post- relative to the pre-reform period. Results
in Table A.2 of Appendix A.2 illustrate that no pre-treatment characteristics show a signicant discontinuity
at the 15 employees threshold after the reform in the 3nd degree polynomial specication. A few covariates
pop up as signicantly dierent from zero in the 2nd degree polynomial specication, but the spotty nature of
these gaps and the fact that their signicance diers according to the polynomial used supports the notion that
our controlled comparisons to the left and right of the 15 employees threshold before and after the reform are
indeed a good experiment.19
Second, we run regressions of the probability of workers moving to a rm above or below the threshold on a
number of determinants that include a small-rm dummy interacted with year dummies. Results in Table A.3
of Appendix A.2 show some evidence of sorting, as the probability of moving to rms larger than 15 employees
coming from a rm below the threshold decreases after the reform. However, reassuringly, the same table also
shows that this eect is apparently not driven by workers' attributes correlated with their productivity.
Because we cannot rule entirely out the possibility of non-random sorting of workers, the next section will
show results including workers xed eects and match xed eects. This helps addressing the concern that
workers select their most preferred EPL regime to the extent that it controls for all time-invariant unobservable
worker- and match-specic attributes that aect workers behaviour. Of course, workers and match eects do
not allow us to control for the time-varying factors that aect workers' self-selection.
5 Results
Before turning to the estimates, we provide a visual summary of the relationship between rm size and wages
around the threshold. Figure 3 draws a scatter plot of the dierence between post-reform (years 1991 to 1993)
and pre-reform (year 1989) log wages against rm size in 1988. The gure, as well as the regressions, cover an
interval of [-10,+10] around the 15 employees threshold. Firms outside the 10-unit band are either far below
or well beyond the relevant cut-o to be relevant. In Section 5.1 we experiment with dierent bandwidths and
with an optimal bandwidth method.
19Notice that this test gives also insights on whether other (unobserved) policies dierentially aect small and large rms
since 1990. In principle our empirical strategy may be hampered by the presence of unobserved factors (for example another
policy change) that are also discontinuous at the threshold exactly at the time of the reform, thus confounding the eect of the
reform itself. Although we cannot directly test this assumption, we can investigate whether rms observable characteristics have
discontinuities at the threshold after 1990. Results in Table A.2 of Appendix A.2 are also suggestive that the eect of the change
in EPL is unlikely to be confounded with the eect of another policy that depends on rm size and shares the same threshold.
16Figure 3. Wages are measured at the rm level averaging individual wages in intervals of 0.1 rm size in 1988. The dots are
the observed dierences between log wages post-reform (averaged in years 1991, 1992 and 1993) minus log wages pre-reform in year
1989. The solid line is a tted regression of log wage dierences on rm size in 1988, performed separately on either side of the
threshold.
The gure is obtained averaging individual wages by rm size in 1988. Each point is the dierence of log
wages post-reform (the average of rm-level log wages in years 1991 to 1993) minus log wages pre-reform in 1989.
The gure also reports the tted values of a regression of log wage dierences with respect to rm size in 1988.
As rm size is measured in 1988 to minimize endogeneity issues, the picture can be thought of as representing
the reduced form of the IV specication. The gure shows a positive jump in the dierence between post- and
pre-reform log wages at the 15 employees threshold, meaning that in the neighbourhood of the threshold wages
in small rms decrease after 1990 relative to wages in large rms. The jump appears to be small but signicant,
suggesting that small rms translate part of the increased cost of EPL onto lower wages.
The general pattern presented in the gure is also borne out in the regression results to which we now turn.
Dierently from the gures, the regressions are run on individual wages and allow us to control for both workers
and rms characteristics.
Table 2 reports regression results from the estimation of Equation (1). In Panel A the year of the reform,
1990, is excluded. For the sake of space we only show the coecient of interest on the interaction term between
the small-rm dummy and the post-reform dummy.Results in Column 1 of Panel A include workers xed eects
and suggest that individuals employed in rms just below the threshold of 15 employees are paid 0.4 percent
less than workers in rms immediately above the cut-o after 1990. Columns 2 and 3 show that the signicance
of the result does not survive the inclusion of rm and match eects, respectively. Finally, Column 4 refers to
IV (with worker xed eects) estimates in which we instrument the treatment status using rm size in 1987 and
1988. IV results deliver a negative and signicant coecient more than twice as large as the baseline coecients
17Table 2. Average eects of 1990 EPL reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: excluding the reform year 1990
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011
[0.002]** [0.002] [0.002] [0.004]***
Observations 96333 96333 96333 76814
R2 0.16 0.22 0.17
Panel B: including the reform year 1990
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009
[0.001]*** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.002]***
Observations 120652 120652 120652 99658
R2 0.15 0.22 0.16
Worker Eect YES NO NO YES
Firm Eect NO YES NO NO
Match Eect NO NO YES NO
IV NO NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size
of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. First-stage results of the IV specication in
Panel A are shown in Table B.5. First-stage statistics of the IV specication in Panel B are shown in Table B.14. One asterisk
denotes signicance at 10%; two asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
in Column 1. The larger magnitude of the IV coecient may be due to measurement error in rm size that
produces an attenuation bias in non-instrumented regressions. An alternative interpretation is that the larger
size of the IV coecients conrms the importance of instrumenting to account for the sorting of rms according
to unobservable characteristics. In particular, it may suggest that the reform may have induced some rms to
cross the threshold, reducing the gap in average wages observed in the treated and control groups after 1990.
This can happen, for example, if the reform provided greater incentives to low-productivity rms { that before
the reform were keeping their size below the 15 employees threshold to avoid strict EPL rules { to move above
the threshold.
In Panel B, year 1990 is included as a pre-reform year (the reform passed in July and wages are unlikely
to adjust immediately). It shows that the inclusion of 1990 reinforces the results, as the coecient of interest
is negative and signicant in all specications except for the one with match eects.20 To be conservative, in
what follows we exclude year 1990.
One possible concern is that the negative eect of the EPL reform on wages may be driven by either lower
entry or higher exit of rms below the threshold after the reform (or both). The argument is that in the absence
of the reform there would be a larger number of small rms and therefore higher labour demand and higher
wages in the treatment group of rms. Table B.4 in Appendix B shows that the probability of entry decreases
in rms below the threshold relative to larger rms after the reform, though not signicantly so. Also the
20As we will see, this may be due to the fact that the negative wage eect of EPL is mostly concentrated on the entry wage and
is therefore identied o new entrants and not incumbents.
18probability of exit is not signicantly dierent in rms below the threshold relative to larger rms after the
reform. Thus, our results are unlikely to be driven by dierential entry or exit.21
Table B.5 displays the rst stage of the IV model in Panel A of Table 2, i.e. estimates from the regression
of the two endogenous variables DS
jt and DS
jt  Post on the full set of included and excluded instruments (see
Table B.14 for the rst stage statistics of the IV model in Panel B). Column 1 reports results for the small-rm
dummy DS
jt and shows a negative coecient on rm size in 1987: as expected, the larger is the rm in 1987,
the lower the probability of being below the 15 employees threshold over the sample period 1989-1993. This
coecient is insignicant plausibly for the presence among the controls of the polynomial in current rm size.
The interaction term between rm size in 1987 and post-reform dummy is negative and signicant. Size in
1988 enters positively in the regression showing evidence of mean reversion: controlling for size in 1987 and
for current rm size, rms which experience a positive shock in 1988 tend to switch back to their regular size
afterwards. The same pattern of alternating signs applies to the results in Column 2 for DS
jt  Post, in which
all coecients are signicant. The mean-reversion eect highlighted by the alternate sign on rm size in 1987
and 1988 suggests that using a single pre-reform year as an instrument may bias the results. In fact, some rms
assigned by the single instrument to the small (large) size category may actually correspond to rms that are
typically of a larger (smaller) size but that had had a relatively bad (good) year in that period (Martins, 2009).
Finally, the overall power of the instruments is strong { as indicated by the F-test of the excluded instruments
equal to 5.71 and 11031.65 { and Hansen's J statistic (which becomes under the assumption of conditional
homoskedasticity the usual Sargan's statistic) shows that the specication passes the test of overidentifying
restrictions.
Table 3 reports regression results from the estimation of Equation (2), in which we exploit the idea that EPL
should matter more in highly volatile sectors (Micco and Pag es, 2006). We measure employment volatility as the
pre-reform within-sector standard deviation of the rm-level growth rate of employment computed separately
for rms below and above the threshold. Results conrm that the reform bites more in more volatile sectors,
thus ruling out the concern that results are driven by small rm wages being on a declining path with respect
to wages in larger rms above the 15 employees threshold. This is also reassuring since it suggests that we
are capturing the eect of the 1990 reform rather than the eect of some other contemporaneous shock or
legislative change, such as the pension reform or the elimination of the Scala Mobile, which should not have
aected dierently sectors with dierent volatilities.
In addition, to we check whether the reform of collective dismissals of 1991 is behind the negative coecients
on wages estimated in Table 2, we augment the baseline specication of Equation (1) with a post-1991 reform
dummy and its interaction with the small-rm dummy. Contrary to what one would expect if the 1991 reform
was driving our ndings, (unreported) regression results show that the interaction term with the post-1991
reform dummy is not signicant while the interaction term between the post-1990 reform dummy and the
21These results compare fairly well with Kugler and Pica (2008) who nd a negative, but signicant, eect on entry and no
eect on exit on a nationwide Italian sample representative of the population of workers rather than rms. The dierence in the
entry result may be explained by the fact that Kugler and Pica (2008) use the date of incorporation of the rm as an indicator for
rm entry. This measures the incorporation decision and diers from entrepreneurial entry rates (Da Rin et al., 2011) that we are







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20small-rm dummy remains negative and signicant.22
5.1 Robustness checks and placebo tests
In this section we show that our results are robust to a number of checks. In light of the discussion on rm and
workers sorting, we perform our robustness exercises both on the model with workers xed eects and on the
model with IVs and workers xed eects which allows to control for both types of sorting.
In Table B.6 and B.7 we implement placebo tests by estimating the treatment eect at fake rm size
thresholds and fake reform years, where there should be no eect. We rst estimate the treatment eect below
and above the fake 6, 10, 20 and 23 employees thresholds. The coecients of interests are mostly insignicant.
Table B.6 shows that the fake rm size threshold is signicant only at 20 employees, but the signicance
disappears in the IV specication. In Table B.7 we estimate the treatment eect before and after the fake
reform years 1991, 1992, 1988 and 1989 (excluding in turn the fake year of the reform as we did with 1990 in
Table 2). A signicant negative eect appears only in 1991 (i.e. considering 1989 and 1990 as pre-reform years
and 1992 and 1993 as post-reform years). This is not surprising because 1991 is the year immediately after the
reform and we may take this result as an indication that 1990, the year of the actual reform, belongs to the
pre- rather than the post-reform period. Finally, the interaction between the small rm and the post-reform
dummy is not signicant when considering 1992 and 1989 as reform years, and turns positive when we pretend
that the reform occurred in 1988.
In Table B.8 we run robustness checks with respect to the time span of the sample, enlarging it from the
benchmark 1989{1993 to 1988{1993, 1987{1994, 1986{1996 and 1986{1994, and restricting it to 1989{1991 and
1989{1992. In all cases the eect is negative and signicant, except for the 1988{1993 sample in the specication
with worker xed eects and the 1987{1994 sample in the specication with worker xed eects plus IV in which
signicance is not attained.
Table B.9 shows that the results are robust to alternative specications of the polynomial in rm size.
Results are generally robust to using a rst and second degree polynomial, except for two cases where the IV
estimates are still negative but insignicant. Finally, in Table B.10 we t a linear regression function to the
observations distributed within a distance  on both sides of the threshold:






+ "ijt for rm size 2 [15   ;15 + ] (4)
where Xijt contains the same controls as in Equation (1). We choose  with the cross-validation method of
Imbens and Lemieux (2008). The cross-validation method consists in choosing  so as to minimize the loss
function: L() = 1
N
PN
i=1(logwi   [ logw(fsizej))2 where, for every fsizej to the left (right) of the threshold
15, we predict [ logw(fsizej) as if it were at the boundary of the estimation using only observations in the
interval fsizej 2 [15 ;15+]. The optimal  chosen between 1 and 15 is  = 12 with L(12) = 0:03762235.
22Kugler and Pica (2008) also empirically distinguish the 1990 and the 1991 reforms and conclude that the latter reform has no
dierential eect over and above that of the 1990 reform. Paggiaro, Rettore and Trivellato (2008) examine aspects of the 1991 law
concerning active labour market policies and nd limited eects only on workers aged 50+
21Figure 4. Entry wages are the rst observed wage in a new rm for workers who change rms at least once in the period
1989-1993. Wages are measured at the rm level averaging individual log entry wages in intervals of 0.1 rm size in 1988. The dots
are the observed dierences between log entry wages post-reform (averaged in years 1991, 1992 and 1993) minus log entry wages
pre-reform in year 1989. The solid line is a tted regression of log entry wage dierences on rm size in 1988, performed separately
on either side of the threshold.
Table B.10 shows that the results are robust to the specication change: the local linear regression estimator
yields a negative signicant coecient on samples taken over dierent years, except for the IV model in the
1989{1993 sample.
Overall, these results indicate the presence of a robust, negative and signicant (albeit small) eect on wages.
However, only on the basis of these coecients, we cannot tell whether the translation of the EPL cost onto
wages was total, partial or negligible: we will attempt an exercise to assess the extent of translation in Section
7.1. Before turning to that, we provide several pieces of evidence that wage changes in consequence of higher
EPL are very heterogeneous and depend on the bargaining position of workers.
6 Heterogeneous eects
6.1 Impact at entry
The theoretical considerations made in Section 2.1 suggest that newly-hired workers should be a in weaker bar-
gaining position compared to incumbent workers because rms do not pay severance if there is no agreement on
the wage at the rst encounter. On the contrary, higher EPL should strengthen incumbent workers' bargaining
position and possibly lead to a wage increase if workers are able to renegotiate their wages. In what follows we
investigate the dierent impact of the reform on new entrants' and incumbents' wages.
To this aim, we identify the subsample of incumbent workers, which consists of all workers who stayed in
the same rm over the sample period, and the complementary subsample of movers which includes all workers
22Figure 5. The sample of incumbents includes only workers who stayed in the same rm between 1989 and 1993. Wages are
measured at the rm level averaging individual log wages in intervals of 0.1 rm size in 1988. The dots are the observed dierences
between log wages post-reform (averaged in years 1991, 1992 and 1993) minus log wages pre-reform in year 1989. The solid line is
a tted regression of log wage dierences on rm size in 1988, performed separately on either side of the threshold.
who changed rm at least once over the same period. Obviously, we observe the entry wage only in the sample
of movers. Descriptive statistics in Table B.11 (which includes year 1990 and for this reason displays the same
number of observations as Panel B of Table 2) show that movers are a little less than one third of the sample:
35690 observations out of 120652 (the proportion remains the same once year 1990 is dropped as shown in Table
1). Column 1 shows that the proportion of job changes is pretty stable over the sample period at around 9% per
year.23 The wage of incumbent workers is obviously higher than the wage of movers (Columns 2 and 3) because
of tenure eects. For the same reason movers' entry wages are lower than movers' post-entry wages (Columns
4 and 5). Before looking at the dierential eect of EPL on the wages of new entrants and incumbents using
our regression framework, we display movers' entry wages, i.e. the rst observed wage of a mover in the new
rm, in Figure 4, and the wages of incumbents workers in Figure 5. Individual wages are averaged by rm size
in 1988 in the gures.
Figure 4 draws a scatter plot of the dierence between log entry wages post-reform (year 1991 to 1993) and
log entry wages pre-reform (year 1989). The gure also reports the tted values of a regression of log wage
dierences with respect to rm size in 1988. The signicant jump at 15 implies that after the reform entry
wages are lower in rms below the threshold relative to rms above the threshold. On the contrary, the same
relationship plotted for the sample of incumbents (Figure 5) shows no jump, meaning that there is no dierence
between the average wages of incumbents paid in rms below and above the threshold before and after the
reform. This visual evidence is consistent with the idea that most of the burden imposed by higher ring costs
23Notice that in Appendix A.2 we analyse the probability of workers moving from rms below the threshold to larger rms above
the threshold (and viceversa) conditional on moving, while table B.11 reports the unconditional proportion of job changes.
23Table 4. Movers and incumbents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small rm  Post 1990 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.007
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
Mover dummy -0.036
[0.005]***
Mover dummy  post 1990 0.013 -0.019 0.009 0.009
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]* [0.008]
Mover dummy  small rm 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.033
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.021]
Mover dummy  small rm  post 1990 -0.019 -0.003 -0.015 -0.025
[0.006]*** [0.006] [0.006]** [0.011]**
Observations 96333 96333 96333 76814
R2 0.16 0.23 0.17
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. Movers are dened as workers who change rm at least once over
the period 1989-1993. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies,
year dummies and a blue collar dummy. IV rst-stage statistics are shown in Table B.14. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%;
two asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
is translated onto lower entry wages, with incumbents' wages virtually unaected.
In Table 4 we report the regression results adding the usual individual and rm characteristics. The re-
gressions conrm that movers account for the overall eect that we see in the baseline regressions in Table 2.
Movers suer an average 2-2.5 percent wage loss in rms below the threshold relative to larger rms after the
reform. Incumbents experience no signicant change in their wages. This result is consistent with the idea that
incumbents are not able to renegotiate their wages. This may be either because no renegotiation round took
place in the post-reform period, or because workers have no credible threat if the rm refuses to renegotiate
their wage (McLeod and Malcomson, 1993).
We next focus on the subsample of movers in order to analyse whether the EPL reform impacts movers'
wages at entry or afterwards. To do so, we augment our baseline specication of Equation (1) with an entry
wage dummy, fully interacted with the small-rm dummy and the post-reform dummy. We also add a pre-entry
dummy (a dummy equal to one for the observations prior to the rst job change observed) fully interacted with
the small-rm dummy and the post-reform dummy to be able to interpret the interaction between the small-rm
dummy and the post-reform dummy as the eect on the post-entry wages. Table 5 shows that movers experience
a wage decline at entry and, consistently with the results on incumbents, no changes in the post-entry period.
The decline at entry is sizeable and ranges between 3 and 6.3 percent depending on the dierent specications.
This result suggests that workers paid for the introduction of EPL with a lower entry wage and were unable to
renegotiate their wages upwards in later years.
We nally look at the impact of EPL on wage-tenure proles: we augment our baseline specication with
a full set of interactions between tenure, the small-rm dummy and the post-reform dummy. Table 6 shows
a one/two percent decline in the wage-tenure prole of workers in rms below the threshold relative to larger
rms after the reform, both in Panel A and in Panel B. In Panel A we keep all workers and calculate their
tenure starting from 1985, the rst available year in the sample. However, since tenure is properly measured
24Table 5. Movers entry and post-entry wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.004 -0.015 0.005 0.002
[0.012] [0.010] [0.012] [0.021]
Entry dummy -0.042 -0.037 -0.053 -0.064
[0.016]** [0.013]*** [0.016]*** [0.025]**
Entry dummy  Post 1990 0.034 0.026 0.052 0.054
[0.017]** [0.013]* [0.016]*** [0.027]**
Entry dummy  Small rm 0.036 0.000 0.051 0.064
[0.019]* [0.016] [0.019]*** [0.030]**
Entry dummy  Small rm  Post 1990 -0.034 0.001 -0.048 -0.063
[0.020]* [0.016] [0.019]** [0.033]*
Observations 28451 28451 28451 16140
R2 0.13 0.17 0.11
Worker Eect YES NO NO YES
Firm Eect NO YES NO NO
Match Eect NO NO YES NO
IV NO NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. The sample includes only movers. All specications include a
third degree polynomial in the size of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies, a blue collar dummy and a pre-entry
dummy (a dummy equal to one for the observations prior to rst job change observed) fully interacted with the small-rm dummy
and the post-reform dummy. IV rst-stage statistics are shown in Table B.14. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
only for employment relationships that start in 1985 or later, in Panel B we keep only workers who start a new
job spell after 1985. The small dierence in the results between Panel A and Panel B, notwithstanding the
large dierence in the number of observations, is reassuring that tenure is not endogenous to EPL. The negative
eects of EPL on wage-tenure proles are consistent with Scoppa (2010) who nds that the 1990 EPL reform
increased absenteeism in rms with 15 or fewer employees, and may be explained by the fact that EPL reduces
eort and productivity growth (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005).24
6.2 Occupation and age
The bargaining power of workers may dier not only across insiders and outsiders. There are other possible
dimensions { that relate to the individual characteristics { along which the bargaining power may be heteroge-
neous. In what follows we cut our dataset into high- (white collar, old) and low-bargaining power subsamples
(blue collar, young).
Table 7 reports regression results from the estimation of a version of Equation (2) in which the triple
interaction term identies the dierential eect of the reform on the above mentioned subgroups, which arguably
have dierent bargaining power. Panel A looks at blue collars: we nd no signicant dierence relative to white
collars. In Panel B we nd a signicant negative eect for young workers aged less than 30, both in the baseline
specication with workers xed eects and in the IV specication. Finally, the subgroup of young blue collars
24Unreported results show that the eect of the reform on the tenure prole is driven by the impact on incumbents' tenure
proles. However, the fact that movers' tenure proles seem unchanged may be due to the very short spells of tenure observed for
those who moved in the last years of the sample.
25Table 6. Eect of the 1990 EPL reform on the tenure prole
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: full sample
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 -0.019
[0.003]*** [0.003] [0.003]** [0.009]**
Tenure 0.003 0.049 -0.010 0.010
[0.003] [0.003]*** [0.010] [0.007]
Tenure  Post 1990 -0.002 -0.008 0.001 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003]*** [0.003] [0.004]
Tenure  small rm 0.005 -0.002 0.008 0.009
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]** [0.008]
Tenure  small rm  Post 1990 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]** [0.005]
Observations 96333 96333 96333 76814
R2 0.16 0.25 0.17
Panel B: censored sample
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.044
[0.005]* [0.005] [0.005] [0.016]***
Tenure 0.002 0.032 -0.017 -0.014
[0.005] [0.004]*** [0.010]* [0.013]
Tenure  Post 1990 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.016
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004]* [0.009]*
Tenure  small rm 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.034
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014]**
Tenure  small rm  Post 1990 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.019
[0.005] [0.005]** [0.005]* [0.010]*
Observations 56912 56912 56912 38943
R2 0.15 0.21 0.16
Worker Eect YES NO NO YES
Firm Eect NO YES NO NO
Match Eect NO NO YES NO
IV NO NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. Tenure is standardised to zero mean and unit variance. In Panel
B we drop individuals for whom the starting date of the job is not observed. All specications include a third degree polynomial in
the size of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. IV rst-stage statistics are shown in
Table B.14. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance
at 1%.
26Table 7. Heterogeneous wage eects of the 1990 EPL reform: blue/white collars, young/old, and young blue
collars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Blue/white collars
Small rm  Post 1990 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.000
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.010]
Blue collar  Small rm  Post 1990 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.0011]
Observations 96333 96333 96333 76814
R2 0.16 0.22 0.17
Panel B: Young (< 30)/old (> 40)
Small rm  Post 1990 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.009
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007]
Young  Small rm  Post 1990 -0.012 -0.002 -0.008 -0.020
[0.005]** [0.005] [0.005] [0.011]*
Observations 61899 61899 61899 46622
R2 0.15 0.23 0.16
Panel C: Young blue collars
Small rm  Post 1990 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.008
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007]
Young blue collar  Small rm -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.021
 Post 1990 [0.005]** [0.005]* [0.005] [0.011]*
Observations 61899 61899 61899 46622
R2 0.15 0.26 0.16
Worker Eect YES NO NO YES
Firm Eect NO YES NO NO
Match Eect NO NO YES NO
IV NO NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. Young workers are dened as under the age of 30 and old workers
over the age of 40. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year
dummies and a blue collar dummy. IV rst-stage statistics are shown in Table B.15. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
in Panel C displays signicant negative eects in all specications except for the one with match eects.
Overall the results presented in this section t the interpretation that the negative wage eects of EPL are
inversely related to the bargaining power of workers, measured indirectly with workers' observable character-
istics. We investigate further this issue moving to a subsample of workers for which we have a more direct
measure of bargaining power, namely the individual wage premium over the contractual minimum wage.
6.3 Contractual minimum wages and quantile regression
Similarly to many other European countries, Italy has a system of contractual minimum wages bargained every
2 years (with many delays and exceptions) at the industry level which extends also to non-signatory workers.
Employers can negotiate supplemental wage premiums over and above the contractual minimum wage at the
rm level and employees also receive individual premiums and bonuses. In this section we exploit information
27on contractual minimum wages to construct a measure of the \wage drift", i.e. the dierence between the actual
wage and the contractual minimum. The contractual minimum wages are dened by industry and occupation
category (typically 5 or more categories according to tasks performed and tenure). Thus, the wage drift in
percentage terms is yijzt = (wijt  wmin
jzt )=wmin
jzt where wmin
jzt is the contractual minimum in sector j for a worker
of occupation category z.
Our data allow us to identify the sectoral contracts and the occupation category for a subsample of workers.
For this subsample we know the contractual minimum wage that applies to their jobs, however, the matching of
each worker to her contractual minimum has a cost in terms of observations due to missing information either
on sectoral contracts (for example rms in the chemical industry and in industries covered by narrow sectoral
agreements) or on the occupation category of the worker. We can match only around 40% of the observations
present in the benchmark sample to their respective contractual minimum wages.
We have information on contractual minima in 21 types of contracts in Table B.12.25 Notice that collective
contracts do not correspond exactly to sectors but vary also according to rm size and type of rm. The
distribution of the characteristics of the workers (proportion of white collar workers, average age and wages) in
the resulting subsample (13.7%, 38.7 years and 321.2 Euro per week at 1995 prices) is similar to the distribution
in the overall estimation sample (14.4%, 36.9 years and 314.29 Euro per week). This is suggestive that the loss
of observations due to missing information is not endogenous to the variables of interest.
Table B.12 reports the distribution of the wage drift for all available contracts and shows that there is a wide
variation across contracts in the incidence of the contractual minimum as a percentage of the full compensation.
The table reports the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 95th quantile of the wage drift distribution by each
contract. The median wage drift diers by sector and goes from 25.2% in textile artisanal rms to 91.8% of the
professional services sector. Notice that even at the 5th percentile the wage drift is on average a sizeable 12.5%,
suggesting that wage minima are hardly binding.
As long as individual-specic premia and rm-wide premia paid above the minimum are a result of bargaining
in local contracts, the wage drift can be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power of the workers: the higher
the actual wage with respect to the contractual minimum, the higher the bargaining power of the workers (Card
et al., 2010). Following this reasoning { and consistently with the previous results { we should expect larger
wage cuts for low-bargaining power workers with small wage premia over the minimum. Of course, wages at (or
very close to) the minimum should be insensitive to changes in EPL because of the binding contractual (and
legal) 
oor. To investigate these hypotheses we run a quantile regression at dierent points of the distribution
using as a dependent variable the wage drift yijzt = (wijt wmin
jzt )=wmin
jzt . Let Q(yijztjXijt) for  2 (0;1) denote
the th quantile of the distribution of yijzt conditional on individual and rm characteristics included in the














25The contracts for rms in the insurance sector and in cooperative rms in the construction sector cover only a very small
number of workers in the sample (10 and 17 observations) and have been dropped.
28Table 8. Heterogeneous wage eects of 1990 EPL reform: quantile regression
Q05 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log wages
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -.011
[0.006]*** [0.004]** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.007] [0.008]
Observations 96333 96333 96333 96333 96333 96333 96333
Wage drift
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.032 -0.025 -0.021 -0.009 -0.010 -0.006 -0.020
[0.010]*** [0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.007] [0.011] [0.018] [0.024]
Observations 38895 38895 38895 38895 38895 38895 38895
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) clustered by individual. The wage drift is dened as (wage-contractual
wage)/contractual wage. Contractual wages are bargained at the national level by sector and occupation category (typically 5 or
more categories according to tasks performed and tenure). All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the
rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies, a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two asterisks
denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained from individual resampling.
Table 8 reports the estimates of the coecient of the interaction term 2 obtained at the 5th, 10th, 25th,
50th, 75th, 90th and 95th quantile of the log wage and of the wage drift distributions. Panel A shows the results
on log wages in the benchmark period 1989-1993, Panel B on the wage drift as dened above in the same sample
period. Results show that the negative eect of the reform on the log wages of workers of rms below the 15
employees threshold is stronger at the bottom of the distribution and weaker at the top. Panel B exhibits an
even stronger pattern using the wage drift as a dependent variable. In particular, the eect at the 5th percentile
of the wage drift distribution is more than ve times larger than the eect at the 90th of the distribution and
is three times as large as the average eect obtained in Table 2.
These results are in accordance with the interpretation that rms were able to translate the increased EPL
costs onto workers with low bargaining power. The fact that we nd a strong eect also on wages very close to
the minimum (the 5th percentile of the wage drift) is explained by the fact that even at the 5th percentile, as
remarked above, there is room for adjustment.
6.4 Local labour markets
According to models with labour market frictions, the tightness of the local labour market aects workers'
outside option and eventually their wages. As a nal exercise, we therefore test whether the eect of the reform
diers across local labour market. To do so we exploit a sample of workers which covers the whole Italian
territory. The dataset is drawn from the same administrative source as our VWH dataset, namely the Italian
Social Security Administration (INPS) archives. The original data is a 1/90 random sample from the stock of
employed workers with social security records drawn every year, with workers born on the 10th of March, June,
September, and December of every year being sampled. We use a 10% random draw from this orginal dataset,
29Table 9. Heterogeneous wage eects of 1990 EPL reform: local labour markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1989-1993 1988-1993 1987-1994 1986-1995
Panel A: rm size 5-25
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.010 -0.010 -0.017 -0.018
[0.011] [0.009] [0.008]** [0.007]**
Employment rate 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.021
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]**
Employment rate  Post 1990 0.000 0.007 0.006 -0.005
[0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.008]
Employment rate  Small rm -0.016 -0.017 -0.024 -0.020
[0.018] [0.013] [0.012]* [0.010]*
Employment rate  Small rm  Post 1990 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.020
[0.017] [0.012] [0.010]* [0.009]**
Observations 7323 9147 12894 16637
R2 0.63 0.69 0.68 0.71
Panel B: rm size 10-20
Small rm  Post 1990 -0.015 -0.015 -0.023 -0.022
[0.011] [0.008]* [0.007]*** [0.009]**
Employment rate 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.033
[0.013] [0.011]* [0.010]* [0.009]***
Employment rate  Post 1990 -0.012 -0.014 -0.010 -0.018
[0.013] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007]**
Employment rate  Small rm -0.039 -0.050 -0.054 -0.043
[0.014]** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]***
Employment rate  Small rm  Post 1990 0.036 0.046 0.047 0.038
[0.014]** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]***
Observations 3727 4622 6502 8362
R2 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.72
Match eects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by region in brackets. Estimates are based on a random 10% sample of a data set drawn
from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) archives. Employment rate is the regional rate of employment of males
aged 25-64 (standardised to zero mean and unit variance). All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size of the
rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies, a blue collar dummy, regional dummies and regional trends. One asterisk
denotes signicance at 10%; two asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
30as in Kugler and Pica (2008). Contrary to our main sample, it is a representative sample of workers and not of
rms, therefore we can neither use IVs nor can we follow rms over time. To control for rms', workers' and
match unobserved heterogeneity, we will show results using match eects.
Before moving to regression results, Table B.13 compares the main characteristics of males aged 20-55 in
the Italian sample and in the VWH sample (Columns 1 and 2). It shows that the average characteristics of
workers in the two datasets are similar, except for a higher shares of white collar workers in the Italian sample
(20% against 14%), due to the fact that Veneto is a predominantly manufacturing region. In particular, in
1990 the Veneto region has the same average wage as the national average. Columns 1 and 3 of Table B.13
show that gures for the Veneto region from the two data sources compare fairly well. As a measure of regional
labour market tightness we use the (standardized) regional employment rate of males aged 25-64 because there
is wide variation in labour force participation across regions in Italy. For this reason employment, rather than
unemployment, is a better measure of labour market tightness. In 1989-1993, the employment rate among prime
age men (aged 25-64) in Veneto is slightly above the Italian average equal to 80.22 percent.
Table 9 shows the results for rms in the range 5-25 and 10-20 employees. We estimate regressions with
a triple interaction term where the small-rm dummy is interacted with the period post reform and with the
average regional employment rate. We also control for regional xed eects and region-specic trends. The
average eect on the Italian sample (captured by the double interaction Small  Post) ranges between -0.01
and -0.02 and is generally signicant. The coecient on the triple interaction is instead always positive (and
typically signicant) meaning that workers of rms below the threshold in regions with higher employment rate
suer lower wage losses after 1990. Being Veneto a region with labour market tightness slightly above average,
the results in Table 2 represent presumably a lower bound of the results in other regions. Indeed, the average
negative eect of the reform over the whole Italian territory is larger in magnitude than the eect obtained on
the VWH sample using the same specication.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigates the eects on wages of an Italian reform which introduced severance payments for
rms with 15 or fewer employees in case of unfair dismissal, and left larger rm unaected. On average, we
nd a small but signicant negative eect on wages in rms below 15 employees, between minus 0.7%{1.5%.
Interestingly, the eect is highly heterogeneous depending on the relative bargaining power of workers vs. rms.
These ndings complement those in Kugler and Pica (2008) who nd a signicant reduction in worker 
ows of
around 13-15% induced by the same 1990 reform: we can presume that the substantial eects on worker 
ows
would have been even higher had part of the adjustment not taken place through wages.
It is important to stress that this empirical exercise { which is local in nature as any RDD { cannot
help determining whether any increase in EPL would be (partially) oset by lower wages. However, the rst
advantage of the Italian EPL reform is to oer a clean natural experiment which involved a vast quantity of
rms and workers. Second, being Veneto a relatively rich region with small-sized rms not dissimilar to many
31manufacturing regions in Europe, the estimated eects are unlikely to be peculiar of the area under scrutiny and
may therefore provide useful insights on the eects of EPL reforms in the many countries which have rm-level
thresholds in the application of EPL.
Consistently with the theoretical predictions of models with labour market frictions and Nash bargaining,
we nd that the wage eect of EPL is concentrated on the entry wage of newly-hired workers; furthermore the
negative eect is stronger (i) on young blue collar workers, (ii) on low-bargaining power workers at the low end
of the wage drift distribution and (iii) in regions with low employment rates in which workers have a worse
outside option. Results partially diverge from theory on one account: the two-tier wage model structure  a la
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) predicts that higher EPL improves the bargaining position of workers who are
already locked in an employment relationship. Dierently, we nd that the wage of workers already employed
when the reform was introduced (who stayed in the same rm afterwards) did not increase after the reform;
the same happens to the wage of newly-hired workers in the periods subsequent to entry. These results seem
to suggest that workers are not able to renegotiate wages possibly because, if the rm refuses to renegotiate
wages, the workers' threat point is not credible (McLeod and Malcomson, 1993).
Finally, we use our estimates to try and calculate { albeit roughly { how much of the increase in the ring
cost is translated onto lower wages.26 The Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) model predicts that the wage-oset
of the EPL costs should be total, and pre-paid at entry. In practice, Lindbeck and Snower (1988) list many
reasons why employers may not be able to reduce entry wages by the full extent of the increase in EPL: among
them, liquidity constraints, minimum wage laws or social norms.27 Therefore the extent to which rms can
actually translate EPL costs onto lower entry wages is an empirical question and in the following nal section
we use our results to produce a plausible range of estimates.
7.1 Basic calculations of the translation of EPL costs on wages
We start by considering the situation of a employer-initiated dismissal of a worker of average tenure in a small
rm after the reform. If the dismissal is ruled unfair by the judge, the ring cost will range between 2.5 and 6
months (on average 16 weeks) of the last wage. On the basis of our data, the post-reform average weekly wage
amounts to approximately 313 Euro. Therefore, the severance pay transferred to the worker amounts to 31316
weeks = 5,008 Euro, excluding the legal expenses that can be roughly calculated to be as much as 5,000 Euro.
The above computation results in a very high ring cost, but we should keep in mind that this is the worst
possible scenario for the rm. Ex-ante, the rm does not know with certainty whether the separation will be
ruled unfair by the court. Furthermore, rms and workers may nd a settlement out of court. Gald on-S anchez
and G uell (2000), using data based on actual Italian court sentences, estimate both the probability of reaching
26This quantication exercise is, as our empirical approach, purely partial equilibrium. We leave the quantication of the general
equilibrium impact of EPL within a dynamic GE model for future work.
27Furthermore, rms often sustain some costs in hiring new workers (e.g., advertising, screening). If these costs are incurred
before the rm negotiates the wage with the entrant then they are sunk and therefore the rm cannot shift them onto the wage.
There are other reasons why entrants wages may be higher than their reservation wages: if entrants fear that the rm may dismiss
them before they turn into insiders and gain bargaining power then their reservation wage will be higher to make up for this risk.
Or if insiders can bargain on both their wages and entrants' wages, then they may use their power (through unions for example)
to push entrant wages above their reservation wage, thus reducing hiring and potential competition in the workplace.
32an out-of-court agreement and the probability that the dismissal is ruled unfair to be around 0:5. If we assume
that in case of an out-of-court agreement the employer pays approximately the same sum that would be paid
in the form of severance pay, rms below 15 employees can expect a ring cost equal to 5,008  0:5 = 2,504
Euro excluding legal expenses. If we assume a probability of 10% of the occurrence of individual ring for
economic reasons during a typical employment relationship, the total expected cost ex-ante for the employer is
(5,000 + 2,504)=10 = 750:4 Euro.
Heckman and Pag es (2004) develop a measure of the expected present discounted cost to the rm, at the
time a worker is hired, associated with severance payments to that worker in the future (they also take into
account notice period, which is not of interest here). Adopting an analogous approach, we use the estimates
in the paper to compute the eect of severance payments on the expected present discounted value of wages
calculated at the time of hiring. On the basis of our estimates in Table 2 (Column 4), the wage loss for an
average worker (with average tenure 3.5 years) in a rm below the threshold of 15 employees after the reform
(b 2 =  0:011) amounts to about 3:4 Euro per week (313  0:011) or approximately 179 Euro per year.
We use an annual discount rate of 8%, i.e., a discount factor of  = 0:92. To match an average tenure of 3.5
years, we use an annual survival probability of  = 0:71. Let W be the present discounted value of the wage loss
due to the reform W(b 2j;) = 179
P1
t=0[]t = 516:1. This implies that around 68:8% (516=750 = 0:688) of
the expected ring cost is translated onto lower wages.
This percentage is increasing in the worker estimated wage loss (which depends on the estimated point
coecient and on average worker tenure) and decreasing in the expected ring costs for employers (which
depends on the assumed probability of ring a worker and on legal expenses). In any case, we have shown in
this paper that the estimated extent of the translation of EPL costs on lower wages is an average that hides
heterogeneous eects across workers with dierent bargaining positions.
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37A Evidence on Firm and Workers Sorting
A.1 Firms
To verify if rms sort according to pre-existing observable and unobservable characteristics, we rst estimate a
regression of rms' average wages paid in 1986{1989 (before the reform) on rm size, rm age, year dummies
and rm xed eects. We then use the time-invariant portion of the residual as one of the determinants of the
rm probability of growing. The probit regression is of the form
djt = 
0
Xjt + 0Post + 1dummySjt 1 + 2FEj + 0 (dummySjt 1  Post) (6)
+1 (FEj  Post) + 2 (dummySjt 1  Post  FEj) + "jt;
where djt = 1 if rm j in year t has a larger size than in t   1: The term dummySjt 1 denotes a set of rm
size dummies while the variable Post takes the value of one from 1991. The term FEj denotes the estimated
rm xed eects. The matrix Xjt includes a quadratic in rms' age, year dummies, sector dummies and a
polynomial in lagged rm size.
Column 1 of Table A.1 shows that on average rms just below 15 employees are about 3% less likely to grow
of one unit than larger rms. These results are consistent with Schivardi and Torrini (2008) and Borgarello,
Garibaldi and Pacelli (2004) who nd that more stringent job security provisions hamper rm growth. They
nd that the discontinuous change in EPL at the 15 employees threshold reduces by 2% the probability that
rms pass the threshold. Column 2 shows that the eect is not signicantly dierent before and after the reform
(insignicant coecient on Post 1990  Dummy 15). Finally, Column 3 indicates that the eect is similar for
rms with dierent average pre-reform wages, as the coecient of the triple interaction Post 1990  Firms
Fixed Eect  Dummy 15 is not signicantly dierent from zero.
A.2 Workers
We test whether workers non-randomly sort into rms above and below the 15 employees threshold adopting two
strategies. First, we check whether rms observable characteristics Xjt, such as industry, age, and occupation
(white collar/blue collar) composition of the workforce, are balanced in the neighbourhood of the 15 employees
threshold. The balance tests are performed running the rm-level regression:











jt) + ejt: (7)
Table A.2 shows the coecients and standard errors of 2: No pre-treatment characteristics show a signicant
discontinuity at the 15 employees threshold after the reform in the 3nd degree polynomial specication. In
particular, the age, occupation, and industry composition of rms across the two sides of the threshold is not
signicantly dierent after the reform. The only weakly signicant coecients belong to three industry dummies
in the case of the 2rd degree polynomial specication.
We further test for non-random selection of workers by explicitly looking at their 
ows across rms. If the
reform lowers the wage in small rms relative to big rms after the reform, one may expect larger 
ows of
workers from small to big rms and smaller 
ows from big to small rms after the reform. In order to assess
the extent of worker sorting we run regressions of the probability of workers moving to a big rm or to a small
rm on a number of determinants that include a small-rm dummy interacted with year dummies. The probit

















0t equals 1 if in year t worker i moves from rm j to a rm j
0
with more than 15 employees (Table
38Table A.1. Firm Sorting
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy 13 -0.012 0.014 0.005
(0.014) (0.028) (0.028)
Dummy 14 -0.026 -0.041 -0.041
(0.014)* (0.027) (0.027)
Dummy 15 -0.029 -0.005 -0.001
(0.015)* (0.030) (0.030)
Post 1990  Dummy 13 -0.034 -0.030
(0.030) (0.031)
Post 1990  Dummy 14 0.021 0.030
(0.033) (0.034)
Post 1990  Dummy 15 -0.031 -0.035
(0.033) (0.033)
Firms Fixed Eect 0.242
(0.033)***
Firms Fixed Eect  Dummy 13 0.348
(0.151)**
Firms Fixed Eect  Dummy 14 -0.087
(0.139)
Firms Fixed Eect  Dummy 15 -0.302
(0.165)*
Post 1990  Firms Fixed Eect -0.220
(0.036)***
Post 1990  Firms Fixed Eect  Dummy 13 -0.254
(0.173)
Post 1990  Firms Fixed Eect  Dummy 14 0.011
(0.162)
Post 1990  Firms Fixed Eect  Dummy 15 0.297
(0.183)
Observations 29315 29315 27720
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if in rm j employment at time t is larger than employment
at time t-1, and 0 otherwise. Firms between 5 and 25 workers are included. All specications include a third degree polynomial
in lagged rm size, a quadratic in rms' age, sector dummies and year dummies. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
39A.3, Columns 1 and 2) or to a rm j
0
with fewer than 15 employees (Table A.3, Columns 3 and 4). The dummy
DS
jt 1 indicates the size of the rm of origin and it equals 1 if the rm has fewer than 15 employees. The term
Tt denotes a set of year dummies. The variable FEi (indicated as Workers Fixed Eect in Table A.3) is the
time-invariant component of the individual's average pre-reform wage (between 1986 and 1989) purged of age,
a third degree polynomial in rm size and year dummies. The matrix Xijt includes a quadratic in worker age,
sector dummies and a polynomial in the size of the rm of origin.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.3 show that there is a lower probability of moving to rms larger than 15
coming from a small rm after the reform, i.e. in 1990, 1991 and 1992 (negative and signicant coecients
on T1990  DS
jt 1, T1991  DS
jt 1 and T1992  DS
jt 1). However, Column 2 of Table A.3 shows that the drop in
the probability of moving from a small to a large rm is smaller for high-wage workers in 1991 (positive and
signicant coecient on T1991  DS
jt 1  FEi), while it is independent of (the time-invariant component of)
workers wages in 1990 and 1992 (insignicant coecients on T1990  DS
jt 1  FEi and T1992  DS
jt 1  FEi).
Thus, except for 1991, the probability of moving from a small to a large rm after the reform is apparently
not driven by workers' attributes correlated with their productivity. Results for the probability of moving from
small to small rms (Columns 3 and 4) indicate that there are no dierential eects around 1990 (insignicant
coecients on both T1990  DS














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.4. Eects of the reform on entry and exit
Entry Exit
LPM Probit LPM Probit
Small rm dummy -0.004 -0.087 -0.008 -0.401
(0.009) (0.079) (0.002)*** (0.241)*
Small rm dummy  post 1990 -0.010 -0.012 0.001 -0.070
(0.008) (0.066) (0.002) (0.209)
Observations 28043 28043 28043 28043
R2 0.01 0.00
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 report results from Linear Probability Models and columns 2 and 4 from Probit models. Entry models
include a third degree polynomial in rm size, sectoral dummies and year dummies. Exit models additionally include a second
degree polynomial in rm age. Robust standard errors clustered by rm in brackets. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denote signicance at 1%.
Table B.5. First stage of IV model in Panel A of Table 2
Small Small  Post 1990
Excluded instruments
Size in 1987 -0.0015 -0.0185
[0.0015] [0.0020]***
Size in 1988 0.0020 0.0840
[0.0016] [0.0021]***
Size in 1987  1990 -0.0018 0.0153
[0.0008]** [0.0011]***




F-Test of excluded instruments 5.71 11031.65
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen's J statistic 0.53
(p-value) (0.77)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size
of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
43Table B.6. Falsication exercise: fake rm size threshold
Fake rm size threshold 6 employees 10 employees 20 employees 23 employees
Panel A: Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003]*** [0.005]
Observations 96333 96333 96333 96333
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Panel B: IV + Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.064 -0.007 0.001 0.043
[0.052] [0.006] [0.015] [0.081]
Observations 76814 76814 76814 76814
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size
of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
Table B.7. Falsication exercise: fake reform year
Fake reform year 1991 1992 1988 1989
Panel A: Worker xed eects
Small rm  post reform year -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.002
[0.001]*** [0.002] [0.002]* [0.001]
Observations 96627 96458 139794 136784
R2 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.28
Panel B: IV + Worker xed eects
Small rm  post reform year -0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000
[0.003]* [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 75852 75852 113884 113238
Notes: the sample of columns 1 and 2 is 1989-1993 excluding the year of the falsied reform. The sample of columns 3 and 4 is
1987-1993 excluding the year of the falsied reform. Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specications
include a third degree polynomial in the size of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy.
One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
44Table B.8. Robustness to dierent time periods
Time periods 1989-93 1989-91 1989-92 1988-93 1987-94 1986-96 1986-94
Panel A: Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
[0.002]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002] [0.002]* [0.002]*** [0.002]**
Observations 96333 48332 72526 117630 158116 211267 175835
R2 0.16 0.25 0.2 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.3
Panel B: IV + Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 -0.006 -0.008 -0.018 -0.012
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]** [0.005] [0.008]** [0.006]*
Observations 76814 36320 57593 98840 134191 176648 151189
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size
of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
Table B.9. Robustness to polynomials of dierent degrees
Time periods 1989-93 1989-91 1989-92 1989-93 1989-91 1989-92
Polynomial of degree 1 Polynomial of degree 2
Panel A: Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
[0.002]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Observations 96333 48332 72526 96333 48332 72526
R2 0.16 0.25 0.2 0.16 0.25 0.2
Panel B: IV + Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.005 -0.015 -0.005 -0.008 -0.021 -0.01
[0.003] [0.004]*** [0.006] [0.003]** [0.009]** [0.003]***
Observations 76814 36320 57593 76814 36320 57593
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. All specications include a third degree polynomial in the size
of the rm, age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk denotes signicance at 10%; two
asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.
45Table B.10. Local linear regression with optimal bandwidth
Time periods 1989-93 1989-91 1989-92
Panel A: Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Observations 118308 59450 89030
R2 0.15 0.24 0.19
Panel B: IV + Worker xed eects
Small rm  post 1990 -0.004 -0.011 -0.008
[0.003] [0.003]*** [0.002]***
Observations 94396 46160 71347
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in brackets. Local Linear Regression (LLR) with optimal symmetric band-
width  = 12. All specications include age dummies, sectoral dummies, year dummies and a blue collar dummy. One asterisk
denotes signicance at 10%; two asterisks denote signicance at 5%; three asterisks denotes signicance at 1%.














0.0863 302 290 284 291
(0.281) (78) (70.3) (70.2) (70.3)
1990
0.105 310 297 295 298
(0.307) (80.7) (70.7) (69.8) (71.2)
1991
0.0999 322 309 305 311
(0.3) (83.6) (74.6) (72.1) (75.7)
1992
0.0927 324 310 307 312
(0.29) (85.2) (78.1) (79.4) (77.4)
1993
0.0934 325 310 305 312
(0.291) (88.2) (78.9) (74.3) (80.9)
Observations 120652 84962 35690 10414 25276
Notes: Movers are dened as workers who change rm at least once over the period 1989-1993. The sample period is 1989-1993,
including year 1990. Real wages expressed in 1995 Euro. Standard deviations in parentheses.
46Table B.12. Distribution of wage drift by type of contract
National contract for employees of N Q05 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Non-specied manufacturing rms 276 0.106 0.140 0.203 0.324 0.561 0.815 1.102
Small-size manufacturing rms 180 0.116 0.146 0.194 0.290 0.509 0.715 0.833
Textile artisanal rms 972 0.090 0.112 0.168 0.252 0.427 0.649 0.805
Firms of the food industry 876 0.143 0.217 0.307 0.407 0.545 0.741 1.012
Firms of the shoe industry 333 0.101 0.149 0.214 0.351 0.565 0.801 1.082
Firms of the service sector 6470 0.228 0.281 0.369 0.503 0.705 0.964 1.156
Cooperative rms of the service sector 57 0.232 0.308 0.422 0.480 0.531 0.751 0.841
Firms of the leather industry 1857 0.131 0.186 0.274 0.415 0.645 0.963 1.205
Firms of the construction sector 3111 0.005 0.114 0.223 0.315 0.422 0.579 0.740
Small rms of the construction sector 706 0.061 0.130 0.262 0.381 0.490 0.603 0.706
Construction-related artisanal rms 2184 0.036 0.116 0.216 0.291 0.364 0.478 0.565
Firms of the toys and personal articles sector 144 0.124 0.144 0.217 0.319 0.431 0.699 0.868
Firms of the wood and furniture sector 1595 0.113 0.151 0.201 0.267 0.362 0.519 0.673
Metal-manufacturing and installation rms 6311 0.175 0.232 0.327 0.463 0.663 0.929 1.212
Small metal-manufacturing and installation rms 3191 0.183 0.231 0.332 0.461 0.622 0.868 1.055
Artisanal metal-manufacturing and installation rms 8871 0.116 0.161 0.239 0.365 0.530 0.726 0.879
Firms providing environmental health services 68 0.198 0.218 0.350 0.591 0.852 1.021 1.196
Firms of the transportation sector 649 0.196 0.303 0.431 0.576 0.757 0.951 1.097
Firms providing professional services 160 0.226 0.342 0.544 0.918 1.216 1.647 2.180
Firms of the textile sector 322 0.136 0.159 0.218 0.330 0.463 0.796 1.058
Firms of the tourism sector 562 0.172 0.217 0.284 0.392 0.545 0.772 1.168
Total 38895 0.125 0.179 0.271 0.397 0.579 0.822 1.028
Notes: the wage drift is dened as (wage-contractual wage)/contractual wage. Contractual wages are bargained at the national
level by sector and occupation category (typically 5 or more categories according to tasks performed and tenure).
Table B.13. VWH and (random 10%) Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) archives
Veneto Workers Italian Veneto in the
History (VWH) Sample Italian Sample
Real weekly wages 314.248 315.37 306.97
(82.199) (121.40) (98.76)
Small rm dummy 0.642 0.69 0.66
(0.480) (0.46) (0.47)
Age 36.904 35.99 34.86
(8.722) (9.50) (9.52)
Firm size 13.133 12.76 13.09
(5.602) (5.70) (5.62)
White collar dummy 0.144 0.20 0.14
(0.352) (0.40) (0.35)
N 96333 7323 907
ISTAT
Regional employment rate (males 25-64) 80.22
(2.88)
Notes: The Italian sample is a random 10% sample of a data set drawn from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS)
archives. Employment rate is the average regional rate of employment of males aged 25-64 across 20 Italian regions over the period
1989-1993 (ISTAT Regional accounts). Real wages expressed in 1995 Euro. Standard deviations in parentheses.
47Table B.14. IV First-Stage statistics
Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6
Panel B Panel A Panel B
Hansen J test 4.14 1.18 0.04 10.27 7.35 6.74
(0.13) (0.88) (0.98) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15)
F-tests of excluded instruments of the rst stage equations
Small rm 6.75 5.13 4.72 1.71 4.06 3.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990 9650.85 5612.73 7487.26 563.70 5743.78 1989.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Small rm  var. empl. growth 23.15
(0.00)
Small  Post 1990  var. empl. growth 445.37
(0.00)
Small rm  mover 335.60
(0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990  mover 830.15
(0.00)
Small rm  Entry dummy 269.54
(0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990  Entry dummy 230.25
(0.00)
Small rm  Tenure 4326.39 1647.80
(0.00) (0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990  Tenure 3203.36 948.91
(0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Each column shows the rst-stage statistics of the IV models presented in Table 2 (Panel B) and Tables 3-6. First-stage
results of the IV model presented in Panel A of Table 2 are displayed in Table B.5. The rst row displays the Hansen J statistic
(p-value in the second row). Subsequent rows present the F-test of excluded instruments for each rst stage equation (p-values in
parentheses).
48Table B.15. IV First-Stage statistics (continued)
Table 7
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Hansen J test 0.91 5.95 4.12
(0.92) (0.20) (0.39)
F-tests of excluded instruments of the rst stage equations
Small rm 3.10 2.26 2.18
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
Small rm  Post 1990 5548.92 3017.63 3021.61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Small rm  blue collar 4865.72
(0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990  blue collar 445.37
(0.00)
Small rm  young (below 30 above 40) 135.12
(0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990  young 1198.53
(0.00)
Small rm  young blue collar 151.77
(0.00)
Small rm  Post 1990  young blue collar 1034.74
(0.00)
Notes: Each column shows the rst-stage statistics of the IV models presented in Table 7. The rst row displays the Hansen J
statistic (p-value in the second row). Subsequent rows present the F-test of excluded instruments for each rst stage equation
(p-values in parentheses).
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